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1 Introduction
In many situations, a party establishes relation specific investment not only to increase poten-
tial gains from a relationship but also to enhance his bargaining position over other agents.
This is the case when the agent bearing the cost of investment receives the direct benefits,
which allows him to demand more favorable trade conditions. However, there are situations
when investment occurs even if the direct benefits are appropriated by the non-investing
parties. This type of relation specific investment is called cooperative. An example is the
case of the OEM (original equipment manufacturers) arrangements. Ernst (2000) states that:
“OEM refers to a transactional arrangement between a brand name company (OEM buyer)
and the contractor (the supplier) where the buyer provides detailed technical blueprints and
most of the components to allow the contractor to produce according to specification [...] as
the OEM buyers are responsible for final product quality, typically those buyers must transfer
key technology and timely information to their suppliers”.
An important characteristic of this type of agreements is that the common buyer avoids
contracting with a single supplier. Instead, we observe that a buyer has a group of first-tier
suppliers, complemented by the production undertaken by second-tier.1 A first-tier supplier
has a closer relationship with the buyer and in general the latter has undertaken some sort of
relation-specific investment. Moreover, there is evidence on how first and second-tier suppliers
are structured in different industries. For instance, in the cycling industry, most of the
suppliers, providing raw materials and elaborated components to major OEM buyers, are
rather homogeneous and the buyer has established some sort of specific relation with each
one of them. Conversely, in other industries, the suppliers of intermediate products are rather
heterogenous. The buyer establishes a specific relation with only a small group of them,
which creates a well defined first and second-tier structure. This is the case in the IT industry
where Kang et al (2007) state that: “Dell deals with many different suppliers and among
them, HIPRO has a dominant position”. The picture below represents the market structure
of these two industries, where the size of the boxes of the different suppliers illustrate their
1Under some circumstances, relation-specific investment with a specific agent is done strategically to fore-
close possible competitors. With this spirit, we find the theoretical works of Farrell & Shapiro (1989), Valletti
(2000), and Rey & Tirole (2007). Those papers, try to solve the opportunism that appears when one of
the parties is locked into the relationship. Farrell & Shapiro (1989) consider the introduction of long-term
contracts.
2
relative importance in the market.
Shimano
S1
S2
S3
S4
Cycling industry
k
k
k
k
IT industry
Dell
HIPRO
S2
S3
S4
kH
k2
0
0
Figure 1: Market structure in two industries where the buyer undertakes cooperative investment with
her suppliers. On the left, the cycling industry represents an homogeneous market structure where
each supplier has a similar trading weight with respect to the others. On the right, the IT industry is
characterized by a rather heterogenous structure, where one of the suppliers is larger than the rest. In
this industry, we can easily differentiate between first-tier suppliers, those with a stronger relationship
with the buyer such as HIPRO, and second-tier suppliers, those with a rather humble interaction with
the former.
The aim of this paper is to study what are the incentives for the common buyer to establish
specific relation investment with her suppliers and how she decides to distribute it. We want to
understand what are the factors explaining the coexistence of first with second-tier suppliers
and how investment shapes the market structure in the industry.
By using a common agency framework, where trading contracts are not exclusive, we
show that the existence of cooperative investment and the way the buyer decides to distribute
it among active suppliers depends on the degree of competition in the trading game. Using
recent results on the markets and contracts literature, and assuming that suppliers are able to
coordinate their out of equilibrium offers, the upper bound on the transfer that each supplier
obtains depends on the “loss” of the trading surplus originated from his exclusion.2 This is
directly associated to the gains from trade that the rest of suppliers are able to attain. The
higher the number of suppliers coordinating their out of equilibrium offers, the larger the
gains from trade that can be generated and the lower are the equilibrium transfers of the
latter. Hence, competition in our trading game is more aggressive the higher the number of
2Those refer to the works of Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009,2012) and Martimort & Stole (2011).
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active suppliers coordinating their offers.
In our model, investment exists as an instrument to enhance competition. The investment
that a buyer undertakes to a given supplier, increases his relative importance with respect to
the rest, and this boost his ability to generate trading surpluses. The “loss” from exclusion
of any other supplier is consequently reduced and so is his equilibrium transfer. Whenever
the competition in the trading game is aggressive, such that all the suppliers coordinate their
out of equilibrium offers aimed at excluding any supplier i, the common buyer is interested
in making all suppliers as homogeneous as possible, and she undertakes the same level of
investment to all of them. Conversely, in situations where only a small group of suppliers
coordinate their out of equilibrium offers, ex-post competition is reduced, and the interest
of the buyer is to concentrate investment to a smaller group. Furthermore, the buyer might
decide not to invest if the effect that investment has on the final trading allocation is so large
that it generates a substantial market power of the former.
In general, since all direct gains from investment are appropriated by the non-investing
party, we find that the equilibrium level of investment is lower than the efficient level. More-
over, when higher market competition emerges due to an increase on the number of active
suppliers, the aggregate level of investment decreases. In this case, the effect that investment
has on increasing the competitiveness of the market is reduced. Finally, the level of ex-post
competition has an effect on the number of suppliers who decide to become active in the
industry. In this regard, we find situations where anticipating a higher degree of competition
gives higher incentives to potential suppliers to become active. In our model, a high intensity
of competition attracts a larger number of suppliers, which in turn generates more compe-
tition. Thus, due to the linkages between competition, the number of active suppliers and
investment, a competition authority should take into consideration not only how competition
between the existing suppliers materialize, but also their actual number.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section (2), we give a summary on
the existing literature. In section (3), we present the set-up of the model and establish the
timing of the game. We proceed to solve the model backwards. Therefore, in section (4.1)
we study the properties of the equilibrium trading allocation and the equilibrium transfers
are obtained in section (4.2). We continue in section (4.3.1) by analyzing the link between
investment and competition, and section (4.4) establishes the relation between the number of
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active suppliers and the level of ex-post competition. In section (5) we study the robustness
of our finding, and we finally conclude in section (6). All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Literature
Most of the literature on relation-specific investment has centered in the case where investment
directly benefits the party bearing the cost. The literature on investment generating a direct
benefit to the non-investing party, cooperative investment, is much smaller and the main works
are Che & Chung (1999), Che & Hausch (1999) and Hori (2006). All those models consider a
bilateral trading game where one of the parties decides to undertake cooperative investment.
This literature focuses on contract design and shows that with cooperative investment, the
implementation of simple contracts cannot restore the efficient level of investment.3 As a
result, the introduction of more complex contracts such as option contracts are needed to
restore efficiency. In this regard, Chih-Chi (2005) finds that, in a setting with asymmetric
information on the bargaining game, the equilibrium investment profile is characterized by
over-investment and an option contract is needed to restore the efficient investment profile.
In the present paper, we do not restrict to the case of a bilateral monopoly, and in order
to accommodate our theory to the case of OEM trading arrangements, we consider that a
common buyer is able to trade with many suppliers at the same time. Because the existing
literature has shown the zero value of contracting in settings where investment is purely
cooperative, we work in a model where the signing of a contract before our trading game is
not feasible.
Closer to our work is the literature considering that an economic agent undertakes coop-
erative investment with many others without creating de-facto foreclosure. In this literature,
cooperative investment is modeled as learning by doing. Therefore, McLeod & Malcomson
(1993), Bergemann & Va¨limaki (1996) and Burguet (1996), consider strategic learning in a
multi-period setting. In those models, the supplier has private information which is revealed
through experience with the buyer, and a more efficient relationship arises from experimenta-
tion. In more recent papers, Lewis & Yildirim (2002, 2005), consider a dynamic procurement
3This result contrast with the case of selfish investment. Here, a simple contract allows to restore full
efficiency as in Edlin & Reichelstein (1996), Konakayama et al. (1986), No¨ldeke & Schmidt (1995), Rogerson
(1992) and Schmitz (2002b).
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game where the cost of a supplier decreases when it has contracted with the buyer.4 In their
model, a part of the cost of the supplier is private information and the target of the buyer
is to design a procurement mechanism to induce truth-telling. A duopoly market structure
is assumed and the objective of the buyer is to exploit the learning economies and reduce
information rents. The buyer then rotates her purchases with both suppliers to increase
competition. However, when learning economies are important, the market tips into a mo-
nopolistic structure.5
Despite its appealing dynamic features, trade is exclusive with a single supplier in each
period, and future gains from trade come from previous interactions, as more efficiency arises
from learning. Yet, it is interesting to see that the equilibrium payment that a supplier obtains
is related to the threat of being excluded from the current trading opportunity. Therefore,
the more the supplier has experienced with a buyer, the higher is the likelihood that he trades
the good in the current period, and the larger is his bargaining power. In our model, we also
find that the more the buyer have invested with a given supplier, the higher is his “loss” of
exclusion and the bigger the equilibrium transfers.
Since we consider that a buyer trades with different suppliers at the same time, the litera-
ture on common agency with non-exclusive contracts establishes a natural framework for our
work. At this regard, we borrow from the theoretical works of Bernheim & Whinston (1986),
Segal (1999) and Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009, 2012) where different suppliers of an homogenous
good contract with a single buyer. The former two works, establish what are the general
conditions for an efficient allocation, and the latter two, prove the multiplicity of equilibrium
transfers. The closest paper to ours is Chiesa & Denicolo` (2012), where the authors focus
attention on the analysis of the two extreme equilibria. We depart from their work in three
important aspects. First, by imposing structure on the out of equilibrium offers - we assume
that suppliers are able to coordinate their out of equilibrium offers - we give a characteriza-
4Lewis & Yildirim (2005) is a generalization of their previous work in which they assume that the learning
acquired might disappear with a certain probability if the buyer decides to deal with another supplier. At
this regard this model is related to the literature on switching costs. When switching costs are high, a buyer
might induce suppliers to price more aggressively by credibly threading to replace the incumbent supplier with
his rival. Once the incumbent is replaced, the likelihood to be hired again is reduced if switching costs are
large and the buyer can exhort better terms of trade from the input supplier (switching costs increases the
bargaining position of the buyer). In their setting, the buyer is sophisticated and he manages its procurements
to control for switching costs.
5A similar result is found in Cabral & Riordan (1994).
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tion for a subset of equilibrium transfers. Those are equal to the “loss” of the trading surplus
due to exclusion, which depends on the number of active suppliers coordinating their out of
equilibrium offers. Second, we extend the strategy set by allowing the buyer to undertake
cooperative investment. In this sense, the cost of production of each active supplier is endog-
enized, as well as the resulting market structure. Finally, since we are interested on how the
level of competition and the distribution of investment affects the number of active suppliers,
our setting endogenies the number of active principals in a common agency game.
Last but not least, our work relates to the literature on the “hold-up” problem where an
early formulation is due to Klein, Crawford, & Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979, 1983).
The “hold-up” problem arises due to the fact that parties are unable to bargain over specific
investment due to its unverifyiability. Here, the “hold-up” problem arises because investments
are not contractable. Moreover, since investment is purely cooperative, the problem of being
“held-up” is more severe since all direct gains from investment are appropriated by the non-
investing party. We also find that the “hold-up” problem is related to the number of active
suppliers. Since cooperative investment works as a mechanism to incentivize competition
among suppliers, the investment decreases with the number of active suppliers as competition
arises by other means.
3 Model
We consider a non-exclusive trading game where a monopolistic buyer is able to undertake
cooperative investment with suppliers who produce an homogeneous input. We have a one
shot game played in three stages. At the first stage, potential suppliers decide whether to
become active in the market, and they pay a set-up cost F > 0. At stage two, the buyer
makes cooperative investment with the suppliers in the industry. In particular, with N active
suppliers, the buyer decides how much to invest with each one of them ki ≥ 0. The allocation
of investment is represented by the vector k = (k1, k2, ..., kN ) and the total amount invested
is the sum of individual investments K =
∑N
i=1 ki. We denote by k−i the vector of investment
where the component i is not included.
At stage three, given the allocation of investment, trade takes place. Following the existing
literature, we consider a bidding game in which trade is modeled as a first-price auction where
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suppliers simultaneously submit a menu of contracts and the buyer chooses the quantity she
will purchase from each.6 A typical contract is represented by mi = (xi, Ti), where xi ≥ 0
is the quantity supplier i is willing to sell and Ti ≥ 0 is the corresponding total payment or
transfer from the buyer to supplier i. Because trade in our model is voluntary, we require that
the null contract must be offered in equilibrium i.e. m0i = (0, 0), and this way the buyer is free
not to trade with a given supplier. Hence, suppliers submit a collection of trading contracts,
where the null contract is included. We summarize the moves of the game in the following
timeline.
t1 t2 t3
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Active suppliers
Set up costs: F
Investments
k = (k1, k2, ..., kN )
Bidding game Buyer
choose offers
Execution
Payoffs
Our model is one of complete information, and due to its sequentiality, we obtain the
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
3.1 Payoffs and Surplus
The payoff of the buyer and the suppliers are quasi-linear in transfers.7 The buyer obtains
Π = U (X)−
N∑
i=1
Ti − φ(K), (3.1)
where X =
∑N
i=1 xi is the total quantity traded. The payoffs of each supplier gross of set-up
costs F is
pii (ki) = Ti − C(xi | ki), ∀i ∈ N, (3.2)
where the amount of investment ki directly affects the cost of production of supplier i.
Given the number of active suppliers N and the vector of investment k, the maximum
6We are not considering the situation where the buyer is the one offering the trading contracts. If this
was the case and because the set-up costs are strictly positive, any supplier will anticipate to be “held-up”
and none of them will decide to become active in the industry. We need that the suppliers obtain a positive
expected payoff, otherwise, the result will be a complete market shot-down with no trade in the market.
7This assumption means that all parties have a constant marginal utility for money and this is done for
tractability since our analysis does not depend on welfare effects.
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gains from trade are
TS∗(k) = max
x1,...,xn
[
U (x1 + · · ·+ xN )−
∑
N
C(xi | ki)
]
, (3.3)
where x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗N ) is the vector of the efficient quantities and are the ones that solves
the problem above. For later use, we denote by X∗{−H} =
∑
j 6=H x
∗
j for H ⊂ N the sum of
the efficient individual quantities without taking the quantities of the subset of suppliers in
H. We finish by stating the assumptions regarding the utility and cost functions.
1. U ′x(·) > 0, and U ′′xx(·) < 0.
2. C ′x(·) > 0, C ′′xx(·) > 0, C ′k(·) < 0, C ′′xk(·) < 0 and C ′′′xkk(·) > 0.
3. limX→0 U ′x(·) = +∞, limX→∞ U ′x(·) = 0, limxi→0C ′x(·) = 0 and limxi→∞C ′x(·) = +∞.
From these assumptions, we can establish the efficient investment profile. For a given
number of active suppliers, the efficient investment maximizes welfare, trading surplus minus
investment costs, and this is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the efficient investment profile, the common buyer chooses the same in-
vestment for supplier, and this is defined by
φ′K(K
∗) = −C ′k (x∗i (k∗) | k) , for alli ∈ N.
The efficient investment profile is such that marginal cost of investment equals the marginal
benefit, and the formal proof is in page 34 in the appendix. The convexity of the cost function
and the fact that the marginal reduction of production costs is also decreasing with investment,
makes it optimal for each supplier to produce the same amount of the good. The least costly
scheme is to make each supplier equally efficient and this is equivalent to choose the same
level of investment to each one of them.
4 Analysis
We solve the model backwards. After presenting the equilibrium allocation and transfers, we
proceed by characterizing the vector of cooperative investment. We analyze how the common
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buyer decides to allocate investment and to what extend the equilibrium investment profile
differs from the efficient one. Later, we solve the first stage of the game and we give an
intuition on how potential suppliers decide to become active in the industry.
4.1 Allocation in the trading game
We characterize the equilibrium allocation for a given number of active suppliers N and a
vector of investment k. Because the cost of production of each supplier depends only on his
amount traded and there are no investment spillovers, the individual payoff of each supplier
is not directly affected by the trading contracts submitted by the other suppliers. Therefore,
given the trading contracts of all other suppliers, a supplier effectively plays a bilateral trading
game with the buyer where he has all the bargaining power. Hence, he offers a trading contract
that maximizes the potential gains from trade generated between him and the common buyer.8
As a result, in a situation when all the other suppliers are offering the efficient allocation, it
is optimal for supplier i to offer the efficient allocation as well, i.e.
U
(
X¯∗−i + x
∗
i
)−∑
j 6=i
Tj − C(x∗i | ki) > U
(
X¯∗−i + xˆi
)−∑
j 6=i
Tj − C(xˆi | ki) for any xˆi ≥ 0.
Consequently, there exists an equilibrium where each supplier offers the efficient allocation,
and it is defined by the following system of equations:
U ′x
(∑
N
x∗i (k, N)
)
= C ′x(x
∗
i (k, N) | ki) for all i ∈ N, (4.1)
where the marginal cost of production of each supplier equals the marginal utility of the buyer.
The following two lemmas introduce some properties of the efficient allocation that will
be useful in the remaining of the paper. We introduce the following definition.
Definition 1. (Allocative sensitivity) The object dx∗j/dki for j 6= i is the “allocative
sensitivity”, and corresponds to the change on the efficient allocation due to an increase of
investment undertaken to a competing supplier.
8The first and the second conditions are called “individual excludability” and “bilateral efficiency” in the
literature of market and contracts Bernheim & Whinston (1996) and Segal (1999).
10
Lemma 1. In an equilibrium with the efficient allocation, for a given number of active sup-
pliers, an increase on the level of investment to any supplier i, increases the amount of trade
between the buyer and this supplier, but decreases the amount traded with all other suppliers.
The total amount of trade increases:
i)
dx∗i
dki
> 0, ii)
dx∗j
dki
< 0 for all j 6= i and iii) ∂
∂ki
X∗ > 0.
Hence, the higher the investment undertaken to supplier i the more efficient he becomes
with respect to other suppliers. This entails that he trades more with the buyer and the other
suppliers trade less. The magnitude of the “allocative sensitivity” depends on the primitives
of the economy. Its intensity is implicitly defined in the appendix together with the formal
proof of the lemma, page 32. Finally, because the economy is more efficient, the total amount
traded is also higher.
The following lemma states how the individual and aggregate efficient amount of trade
changes with the number of active suppliers.
Lemma 2. In an equilibrium with the efficient allocation, for a given investment vector, the
amount that each supplier trades with the buyer decreases with the number of active suppliers,
but the aggregate amount of trade is larger.
x∗i (k, N + 1) < x
∗
i (k, N) for all i ∈ N and X∗(k, N + 1) > X∗(k, N).
The greater the number of active suppliers in the industry, the lower the amount of trade
that a given supplier undertakes with the buyer. An increase on the number of suppliers
creates a negative externality because each one trades less in equilibrium. However, the
higher the number of active suppliers the larger is the total amount traded. Again, the formal
proof is in the appendix, page 32, where the convexity of the cost of production is crucial for
the result.9
9Because the equilibrium investment profile changes with the number of active suppliers, the negative
externality can be even larger due to the the substitution effect among investments.
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4.2 Equilibrium Transfers
By restricting attention to the efficient allocation, we proceed to characterize the equilibrium
transfers. The literature on markets and contracts has shown that by no putting any restric-
tion on the trading offers, there is multiplicity in the equilibrium transfers. In this work, we
focus on a subset of equilibrium transfers which are obtained by assuming that suppliers are
able to coordinate their out of equilibrium offers aimed at excluding any other supplier i from
trade. The following two definitions are crucial to characterize the equilibrium transfers.
Definition 2. (Coordination) A set H of suppliers coordinate their offers if the gains from
trade that can be generated between them and the buyer is the largest.
VH
(
X∗−{H} | b
)
= max
{xj}j∈H
U
X∗−{H} + ∑
j∈H
xj | k
−∑
j∈H
C(xj | kj)
 . (4.2)
We denote by x˜j(· | H) the quantity that solves the problem in expression (4.2). By
assuming that suppliers are able to coordinate their offers we define the loss of exclusion.
Definition 3. (Exclusion loss) Those are the trading gains that cannot be realized due to
the exclusion from trade of a given supplier.
The loss of exclusion for a given supplier is directly related to the gains than can be
attained by the rest of the suppliers, and those gains depend on the number of suppliers
coordinating their out of equilibrium offers.10 Regarding the suppliers coordinating their
offers, we assume that:
Assumption 1. For a given investment profile - k - the set of suppliers who coordinate their
out of equilibrium contracts to exclude supplier i are the most efficient ones
Jki = {j ∈ N \ {i} s.t kj ≥ kh for all h 6= i} .
Observe that we are not assuming that the investment of the buyer determines the cardi-
nality of the set, we just state that, given a cardinality of the set Jki , those suppliers belonging
to this set will be the most efficient ones.
10In the literature of markets and contracts, this out of equilibrium contracts are called “latent” contracts
and those are the offers or trading contracts that are never accepted by the buyer, but effectuate a constraint
on the equilibrium transfer of suppliers.
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Following Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009), we know that the difference of the gains from trade
that can be generated between the subset of suppliers in Jki and the common buyer with and
without supplier i are equal to
VJki
(
X∗−{Jki } | k
)
− VJki
(
X∗−{Jki ,i} | k
)
.
Then, with simple algebra and taking that the suppliers in Jki coordinate their out of equi-
librium offers, we obtain that the exclusion loss of supplier i is
Li
(
Jki
)
=
U (X∗)−∑
j∈Jki
C(x∗j | kj)
− VJki (X∗−{Jki ,i} | k) , (4.3)
where
VJki
(
X∗−{Jki ,i} | k
)
= max
{xj}j∈Jk
i
U
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈Jki
xj | x˜i = 0,k
−∑
j∈Jki
C(xj | kj)
 , (4.4)
is the value function representing the maximum gains that can be obtained between the
common buyer and the subset of suppliers in Jki , by putting equal to zero the trading quantity
of supplier i, keeping constant the production of the supplier not in Jki , and choosing optimally
the quantities of the suppliers belonging to Jki .
11 The amount x˜j(· | Jki ) is the quantity
traded that solves the problem in expression (4.4). The convexity of the cost function makes
it straightforward to see that the “loss” of exclusion Li(J
k
i ) is weakly decreasing in J
k
i : J
k
i ⊃
J ′ki =⇒ Li(J ′ki ) ≤ Li(Jki ).12 That is, the more the number of suppliers coordinating their out
of equilibrium offers, the larger is the trading surplus that they can generate and the lower is
the “loss” of exclusion.
Regarding the quantities that are submitted in the out of equilibrium offers, we introduce
the following lemma that will be useful for the rest of the paper.
Lemma 3. For any investment profile - k - and for any subset of supplier Jki ⊂ N . The total
11Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009) consider the case where the set of suppliers is a singleton, and we extend their
finding for any number of suppliers.
12In general this will be strictly increasing.
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amount traded is higher when all active suppliers undertake trade with the buyer:
X∗(k, N) > X∗−{Jki ,i}(k, N) +
∑
j∈Jki
x˜j(k | Jki ),
and
x˜j(k | J ′ki ) > x˜j(k | Jki ) > x∗j (k); ∀J ′ki , Jki ∈ N and J ′ki ⊂ Jki .
The formal proof is relegated to the appendix in page 33. Due to the convexity of the cost
function, the increase of the total amount traded due to an extra supplier always dominates
the increase on the amount traded coming from the subset of suppliers in Jki that is needed
to exclude the former, and this means that supplier “i” is not indispensable. It is immediate
to see that the individual amount that any supplier j ∈ Jki submits in his out of equilibrium
contract to exclude any supplier i is larger than his efficient amount i.e. x˜j(k | Jki ) > x∗j (k).
Since they aim at excluding one supplier, they have to offer a larger amount to the buyer.
Because in our model trade is voluntary and the suppliers have the whole bargaining
power, the equilibrium transfer to any supplier i is the maximal monetary amount such that
the common buyer is indifferent between trading or excluding him from trade.13 Hence, the
equilibrium transfer to any supplier i cannot be greater than the exclusion loss Li
(
Jki
)
for
any Jki as the buyer will decide not to trade with him. This cannot be lower, as supplier i has
an incentive to increase it. Hence, we center our attention to the case where the equilibrium
transfer is equal to this cost of exclusion T ei (J
k
i ) = Li
(
Jki
)
. With these equilibrium transfers,
we can easily obtain the equilibrium payoffs of the trading game. Those are stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. For a given investment profile k and a subset of coordinating suppliers Jki ,
the equilibrium payoffs are given by14
pii(k | Jki ) = TS∗(k)− T˜ S−i(k | Jki ); ∀i ∈ N, (4.5)
13Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009) talk about the threat that a given supplier is replaced from trade. They state
that the upper-bound of the transfer that each supplier can ask for supplying the efficient amount x∗ depends
on the threat of being excluded from trade, and this is related on how aggressively any other supplier bids for
quantities that are larger than the efficient ones.
14Remember that the trading surplus is given by TS∗(k) = maxx1,...,xn
[
U (x1 + · · ·+ xN )−∑N C(xi | ki)].
14
Π(k | Jk) = TS∗(k)−
∑
i
(
TS∗(k)− T˜ S−i(k | Jki )
)
− φ(K), (4.6)
for each active supplier and the common buyer respectively, and T˜ S−i(k | Jki ) is the maximal
trading surplus that can be generated with Jki .
The proof is relegated to the appendix, page 33. Because for a given investment profile,
the payoff of each supplier i decreases with the number of suppliers in Jki a more competitive
equilibrium is associated with a larger set Jki . Hence, we introduce the following definition
regarding the level of competition.
Definition 4. (Competition) An equilibrium outcome is more competitive the lower the
partition of the trading surplus that a supplier can appropriate. Hence, for a given number
of active suppliers N , the most competitive equilibria is when |Jki | = N − 1 = J¯ki . The least
competitive is when |Jki | = 1 = Jki .
Having identified the equilibrium payoffs and defined the notion of competition of stage
three, we can proceed to study stage two of the game when the buyer decides to effectuate
cooperative investment to the active suppliers.
4.3 Investment profile
In this section, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium investment profile which
depends on the level of competition in the trading game. We first analyze the way in which
the buyer allocates investment among active suppliers and then we identify the equilibrium
amount of investment. In equilibrium, investment suffers from the “hold-up” problem because
all direct gains from investment are appropriated by suppliers. Yet, in general, the buyer sets a
positive level of investment. Here, investment works as a mechanism to enhance competition,
and its effectiveness depends on the degree of competition in the trading game. Accordingly,
while we always find a positive level of investment when competition is the most aggressive,
the buyer might decide not to invest in situations when competition is softer.
We start the analysis by introducing the following lemma, which states the way the com-
mon buyer decides to distribute investment.
Lemma 4. With a set of suppliers Jk coordinating their out of equilibrium offers, the allo-
cation of investment is: kj′ = kj > k` > km = 0 for any j
′, j ∈ Jk; ` /∈ Jk and |`| = 1 and
15
∀ m /∈ Jk, `.
The formal proof is relegated to the appendix, page 35, but the intuition is straightforward.
The objective of the investment by the buyer is not to increase the potential gains from trade,
but to reduce the equilibrium transfers to the active suppliers. Because investment to a
given supplier increases the gains from trade that can be generated, since he becomes more
efficient, it reduces the “loss” arising from the exclusion of any other supplier. As a result, the
equilibrium transfers decrease with the investment undertaken by the buyer, and investment
works as a mechanism to increase competition.
Hence, with the objective to constraint the equilibrium transfers of suppliers, the common
buyer only invests towards those suppliers who coordinate their out of equilibrium offers,
and in order to generate the maximum trading surplus of these coordinating suppliers, the
buyer undertakes the same level of investment to each one of them. Additionally, in order to
reduce the equilibrium transfer of the coordinating suppliers, the buyer sets a positive level
of investment to another active supplier ` ∈ N . But since this supplier will coordinates his
out of equilibrium offers only with the set
(
Jk \ j) to exclude supplier j ∈ Jk, and not to
all suppliers, the investment undertaken to him is lower. Finally, the buyer does not invest
towards those suppliers who do not effectuate any constraint to the equilibrium transfers of
others, since any gains coming from investment will be totally appropriated by them. From
the previous lemma, we directly obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In the most competitive equilibrium i.e. Jki = N \ {i}, the distribution of
investment coincides with the efficient distribution.
So far, we have established how the buyer decides to allocate investment depending on the
level of competition in stage three. The amount of investment undertaken is introduced in
the following proposition, where we also compare to what extend the individual equilibrium
amount of investment differs from the efficient one.
Proposition 3. For a given number of active suppliers N ≥ 2:
i) In the most competitive equilibrium, the individual level of investment is always positive,
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but lower than efficiency, and it is given by
φ′K(K) = −
∑
N−1
[∫ x˜(k−i|J¯ki )
x∗(k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
]
.
ii) In any other equilibria of stage three, the equilibrium investment depends on the “allocative
sensitivity”. Hence:
A) the equilibrium investment is zero if the “allocative sensitivity” for all Jk ⊂ N is such that
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m6=Jk,`
dx∗m
dkj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
−∑i∈N\{j} [∫ x˜i(k|Jk)x∗i (k) C ′′xk(τ)dτ]∑
i∈N
[∫ X∗−{Jk,`,i}+∑j∈J x˜j(k|Jk)+x˜`(k|Jk)
X∗ U
′′
xx(τ)dτ
] = λ(Jk). (4.7)
B) If (4.7) does not hold, then the equilibrium investment is positive and distributed as in
lemma 4. The amount of investment is
φ′K(K) = −
∑
i∈N\{j}
[∫ x˜i(k|Jk)
x∗i (k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
]
+
∑
i
∑
m 6=Jk,`
[∫ X∗−{Jk,l,i}+∑j∈Jk x˜j(k|Jk)+x˜l(k|Jk)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
× dx
∗
m
dkj
, ∀j ∈ Jk
and
φ′K(K) = −
∫ x˜`(k|Jk)
x∗` (k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
+
∑
i
∑
m6=Jk,j
[∫ X∗−{Jk\{j},`}+∑i∈Jk\{j} x˜i(k|Jk)+x˜`(k|Jk)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
× dx
∗
m
dk`
, for i = `
where K = |Jk| × kj + k`.
The formal proof is in page 37 in the appendix. From this proposition and the previous
lemma, we see that the buyer sets a positive level of investment due to strategic considera-
tions. Investment is undertaken to constraint the equilibrium transfers of suppliers, but this
enhancing competition mechanism is not sufficient to restore efficiency level of investment.
Due to the nature of investment, the direct benefits are appropriated by the party that does
not bear the costs of investment, and the effect that the investment has on constraining the
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equilibrium transfers of suppliers is of second order compared to the direct gains from trade.
Moreover, the constraining effect that investment has on the equilibrium transfers, when
the equilibrium outcome is not the most competitive, is only beneficial for the buyer as long
as the “allocative sensitivity” created by investment is not too large. Now, the investment
undertaken to a given supplier not only makes him more efficient, but it also constraints
the degree of how investment is able to enhance the competitive pressure among suppliers.
Whether investment has a positive or negative net effect on increasing the competitiveness of
the equilibrium outcome depends on how sensitive is the equilibrium allocation with respect
to investment. When the effect is important, the investment of the buyer sensitively affects
the equilibrium allocation of suppliers and this constraints the effectiveness of the out of equi-
librium offers to constraint the equilibrium transfers. The result is that the suppliers whom
the buyer decides to invest enjoy a market power position and the net effect on increasing
the competitive pressure is negative. In this case, the buyer is better-off with a zero level
of investment. When the effect is small, the investment still plays a positive net effect on
increasing the competitive pressure and the buyer sets a positive level of investment.
Now, we turn on making a closer link between investment and competition. In the next
section we provide a more detailed discussion on the results which we have already obtained,
and we show how the investment per supplier evolves with the number of active suppliers in
the industry.
4.3.1 Investment and competition
We have shown that the equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the
equilibrium outcome. In the most competitive equilibrium, the investment of the common
buyer is perfectly symmetric and active suppliers are homogeneous is stage three. In this
situation, the level of investment per supplier is also big and the objective of the buyer is
to push competition. In any other less competitive equilibrium, the investment profile is
asymmetric and suppliers are heterogeneous ex-post. Investment has a lower stake to increase
competition and its level is generally low.
To establish a closer link between investment and competition, we study how the individual
equilibrium investment evolves with respect to the number of suppliers. We show that the
larger the number of active suppliers, the lower is the investment per supplier. This indicates
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that whenever competition is enhanced due to more suppliers, the effect that investment has
on fostering competition is reduced. Accordingly, the buyer sets a lower level of investment.
The following lemma states the evolution of the level of investment per supplier.
Lemma 5. When the number of active suppliers is N ≥ 2, the investment per supplier
decreases with the number of active suppliers, regardless of the level of ex-post competition.
kj(N) > kj(N + 1); ∀j ∈ Jk.
The main factor driving the result comes from the fact that, the higher is the number
of suppliers, the lower is the amount that the buyer trades with each one. Hence, since the
buyer is effectuating less trade with each supplier, the equilibrium transfer is smaller and the
constraining effect of investment on the transfers is reduced. The formal proof is presented
in the appendix, page 40.
We illustrate the result in figure 2.15 The thick solid line represents the efficient investment
per supplier, and without loss of generality, we draw the two extreme equilibria. Accordingly,
the solid line depicts the most competitive outcome and the dashed line stands for the least
competitive. With less than two suppliers, the equilibrium investment is zero, as the buyer
does not appropriate any direct gains coming from investment. With no competition the
“hold-up” problem is maximal. Whenever there are two active suppliers in the industry, we
start to have a positive level of investment. Whether the investment of the supplier in the least
competitive equilibrium is above or below the one in the most competitive depends on the
degree of the “allocative sensitivity”. In this regard, the picture on the left depicts a situation
where the investment has a small effect on the allocation of the non-investing suppliers, while
the one on the right represents the opposite case.
We proceed to show how the aggregate investment is affected by the number of active
suppliers. The result is introduced in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Regardless of the level of competition in the trading game, the aggregate level
of investment decreases with the number of active suppliers in the industry when N > 2. The
aggregate investment tends to zero when the number of active suppliers tends to ∞.
15This is just an illustration not computed.
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Figure 2: Investment per supplier as a function of the number of active suppliers. The thick black line
stands for the efficient investment. The black thin line corresponds to the highest level of competition
and the dashed lines the least severe competitive equilibrium. The figure on the left stands for the
case when the “allocative sensitivity” is small and the one in the right when it is big.
We have already seen that the investment per supplier decreases with the number of active
suppliers. However, how the aggregate investment evolves depends on whether the individual
reduction of investment dominates the effect of having an extra supplier. In the appendix,
page 41, we show that the first effect dominates and the results are the ones represented in
figure 3. As above, the thick black line stands for the aggregate efficient investment. The grey
Figure 3: Aggregate investment as a function of the number of active suppliers. The thick black line
stands for the efficient investment. The black thin line is the one corresponding to the situation where
the equilibrium outcome is the most competitive, and the dashed line is the one where competition
is the least severe. The grey area are all the feasible aggregate investments arising from the different
types of equilibrium. The figure in the left stands for the case where the “allocative sensitivity” is
small and the one in the right when this is big.
area is the feasible aggregate investment that can be achieved depending on how competitive
is the equilibrium outcome.
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4.4 Active suppliers
In this section, we study how many suppliers becomes active. A given supplier becomes active
as long as the expected payoffs are above the set-up costs F . Therefore, for a given number of
active suppliers N , and any a set of suppliers Jk coordinating their out of equilibrium offers,
the expected payoff of any active supplier is equal to
E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk
)]
= Pr
(
i = j ∈ Jk
)
× pij
(
kj | k, N, Jk
)
+ Pr (i = l)× pil
(
kl | k, N, Jk
)
+ Pr
(
i = m /∈ {Jk, l}
)
× pim
(
0 | k, N, Jk
)
=
∣∣Jk∣∣
N
× pij
(
kj | k, N, Jk
)
+
1
N
× pil
(
kl | k, N, Jk
)
+
N − (∣∣Jk∣∣+ 1)
N
× pim
(
0 | k, N, Jk
)
,
and by substituting this by the equilibrium payoffs that we have obtained in proposition 2 we
get
E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk
)]
=
∣∣Jk∣∣
N
×
(
TS∗(k)− T˜ S−j(k | Jk)
)
+
1
N
×
(
TS∗(k | Jk)− T˜ S−l(k | Jk)
)
+
N − (∣∣Jk∣∣+ 1)
N
×
(
TS∗(k | Jk)− T˜ S−m(k | Jk)
)
= TS∗(k)−
∣∣Jk∣∣
N
× T˜ S−j(k | Jk)− 1
N
× T˜ S−l(k | Jk)
− N −
(∣∣Jk∣∣+ 1)
N
× T˜ S−m(k | Jk),
where the equilibrium vector of investment k as in proposition 3.
Then, a supplier decides to become active in the industry if the expected payoffs are above
the set-up costs, i.e. E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)] ≥ F . In our model, potential suppliers do not only
consider how the gains from trade are distributed but also they take into consideration the
amount of investment of the buyer and its allocation. The following proposition establishes
how suppliers’ expected payoffs changes with both the number of active suppliers and the
number of suppliers belonging to the set Jk.
Proposition 5. The expected payoff of any supplier is decreasing with the number of active
suppliers N and increasing with the number of suppliers who coordinate their out of equilibrium
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offers Jk.
∂E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)]
∂N
< 0,
∂E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)]
∂Jk
> 0.
The first result is necessary to obtain a unique equilibrium in the number of active sup-
pliers in the industry, and the second tells us how expected payoffs evolve with the degree
of competition. With regards to the number of active suppliers, we see that there are two
effects that go into the same direction. The likelihood of being a supplier whom the buyer
decides to invest decreases with the number of suppliers for a given set Jk. There is also an
indirect effect, that is also negative, and comes from the changes in the investment profile
and its effect to the trading surplus that is generated. In lemma 5, we showed that the per
supplier level of investment decreases with the number of active suppliers in the industry.
Considering the change in the expected payoffs with respect to the number of suppliers
belonging to Jk, we see that the overall effect is positive. There is a positive direct effect that
comes from the increased probability of being the supplier to whom the buyer invests and a
positive indirect effect that originates from the change created to the investment profile. The
negative direct effect comes from a higher intensity of competition which generates a smaller
partition of the trading gains.
Competition brings about a larger and more evenly distribution of investment, and this
translates to a larger expected payoffs for suppliers. As a result, a larger number of active
suppliers can be sustained in equilibrium. This result is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Whenever the buyer undertakes a positive level of investment, a higher com-
petitive equilibrium generates higher expected payoffs for the suppliers. The contrary occurs
when investment does not materialize.
E
[
pii
(
k | Jk
)
| k 6= 0
]
≥ E
[
pii
(
k | J ′k
)
| k 6= 0
]
,
E
[
pii
(
k | Jk
)
| k = 0
]
< E
[
pii
(
k | J ′k
)
| k = 0
]
for J ′k ⊂ Jk.
We leave the formal proof in the appendix and we provide a short explanation here. In
the case where there is no investment, either because this does not arise in equilibrium, or
the buyer does not have the technology, lower levels of competition entail a larger number of
active suppliers. Because entry in the industry occurs until the rents are dissipated, a larger
number of suppliers can coexist when they appropriate a larger proportion of the gains from
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trade. This is the case when competition is milder as each supplier obtains more than his
marginal contribution to the surplus. With positive investment, the analysis is richer, now the
amount and the distribution of investment depends on the level of competition ex-post. From
the previous analysis we have established that the total amount invested is in general larger
whenever competition is more intense. This, together with a more homogeneous distribution
of investment makes suppliers to expect larger payoffs even if the partition of the trading
surplus is less favorable. A smaller partition of a larger surplus dominates a more favorable
partition of a smaller one.
In the figure below, we provide a graphical interpretation of the results introduced in the
previous discussion. We illustrate the number of active suppliers as a function of the level
Figure 4: Number of active suppliers as a function of competition for a given level of set-up costs.
The dashed line in red, represents a situation with a decrease of ∆F in the set-up costs. The figure
on left depicts a situation where the “allocative senistivity” is small and the one on the right is when
this is large.
of competition and the magnitude of the set-up costs F . The picture on the left, depicts a
situation where the “allocative sensitivity” is moderate and the buyer always sets a positive
level of investment regardless of the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. In this case,
a larger number of active suppliers is achieved with a more competitive outcome. Conversely,
the figure on the right stands for a situation where the “allocative sensitivity” is sufficiently
big such that the buyer decides not to invest with low competitive outcomes. Hence, in the
set of equilibria where no investment takes place, the number of active suppliers that can be
sustained in equilibrium increases with lower competition. Finally, a reduction of the entry
costs will translate into a larger number of active suppliers but, in general, the equilibrium is
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characterized by too little entry.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have considered the case where investment by the buyer is purely specific.
As a result, the default payoff of any supplier with not trade is equal to zero, regardless of the
level of investment undertaken by the buyer. How our results change when suppliers’ default
payoff depends on investment? What would happen if the outside option is endogenized by the
existence of another buyer whom suppliers might trade with? In such a situation, cooperative
investment would increases the outside option of suppliers as they get better trading terms
with other potential buyers. The IT industry provides some evidence where Kang et al. (2007)
state that:“after winning an order from Dell, HIPRO found it easier to approach other OEM
buyers (i.e., Cisco) and its importance with dealing with Dell increased with respect to other
suppliers”.
Hence, investment may not only help a given supplier to establish a closer relationship
with the investing buyer but it can also encourage to initiate trade with other buyers. This
is the case when investment is aimed at reducing the production costs, because having more
efficient suppliers is in the interest of the industry as a whole. Consequently, investment not
only works as a mechanism to enhance competition among suppliers, but it may also create
competition downstream because some buyers, by free-riding from the investment undertaken
in the industry, may decide to become active.
Therefore, what is the equilibrium investment profile if buyers can free-ride on the in-
vestments undertaken by other competitive buyers? We believe that the problem of being
“held-up” is even more severe. Again this would depend on the degree of investment spillovers
and whether suppliers can also sign non-exclusive contracts with the existing buyers in the
economy. At this regard Felli and Roberts (2013) consider a matching model with many
buyers where parties can undertake specific investment.16 Our approach is to study a simi-
lar problem but without assuming de-facto foreclosure. Nonetheless, we leave it as topic for
future research.
In what follows, we analyze the robustness of our findings by considering the case of selfish
16Another paper studying a similar issue is Samuelson (2013).
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investment. Now, specific investment does not reduce the cost of production but has a direct
impact on the buyer’s valuation for the traded good. Hence, the utility of the buyer directly
depends on the total amount invested S, i.e. U (X(S,N) | S), and it has increasing returns on
investment U ′S(·) > 0 and U ′′xS(·) > 0. The production cost of each supplier does not directly
depend on investment C (xi(S,N)) , ∀i ∈ N, and the cost of investment ψ(S) is increasing
and convex.
With selfish investment, the investing party appropriates all direct benefits from invest-
ment, whose efficiency level is implicitly given by
ψ′S(S) = U
′
S(X
∗(S) | S).
The equilibrium investment for the most and the least competitive equilibrium are respectively
given by
ψ′S(S) = U
′
S (X
∗(S) | S)−
N∑
i=1
∫ X∗(S)
X˜−i(S|J¯)
U ′′xS(τ)dτ,
ψ′S(S) = U
′
S (X
∗(S) | S)−
N∑
i=1
∫ X∗(S)
X∗−{i,h}(S)+x˜h(S,J)
U ′′xS(τ)dτ
+
N∑
i
∑
j 6=i,h
(∫ X∗−{i,h}(S)+x˜h(S,J)
X∗(S)
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
× dx
∗
j
dS
, h ∈ J.
Now, the equilibrium investment is always positive because the buyer appropriates all
direct benefits coming from investment. The direct benefit is represented by the first part of
each expression above. Yet, the “hold-up” problem exists as some part of the benefits from
investment are appropriated by the suppliers, which is represented by the rest of the terms.
The way investment affects the efficient allocation has an effect on the equilibrium investment
profile. However, contrary to the case with cooperative investment, this externality has a
positive effect, and lower levels of competition are associated to larger amounts of aggregate
investment when the “allocative sensitivity” is large.
Additionally, with selfish investment, a larger number of active suppliers entails higher
investment. With more suppliers the part of the trading surplus appropriated by the buyer
is larger. In the figure, we observe that whenever the number of suppliers is arbitrarily large
the equilibrium level of investment coincides with efficiency.
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Figure 5: Aggregate investment as a function of the number of active suppliers. The thick black line
represents the efficiency level and the thin and dashed line stand for the equilibrium level profile in the
two extreme equilibrium of the trading game. The left hand side is a situation where the “allocative
sensitivity” dx∗j/dS is low. The one on the right represents the case where this change is large.
6 Conclusion
The economics of specialization makes the relation-specific investment a current growing phe-
nomenon, whose analysis is essential to understand the well functioning of market transac-
tions. In the present paper, we have considered the case where a monopolistic buyer decides
on specific relation investment. Departing from most of the existing literature, we analyzed
cooperative rather than selfish investment, and we obtained that both the distribution and the
aggregate level of investment depends on the level of competition of the equilibrium outcome.
When investment is cooperative, there exists an endemic “hold-up” problem, since the
investing party does not appropriate the direct gains coming from investment. Yet, the buyer
sets a positive level of investment because, investment to a given supplier, constraints the
equilibrium transfers of the remaining ones. Hence, in equilibrium, the buyer invests to foster
competition among suppliers. We find that, a more competitive equilibrium is characterized by
higher levels of investment and investment pushes competition even further. When the number
of suppliers increases, competition is intensified, and the incentives to invest are reduced. The
model then establishes a positive relation between the level of set-up costs and investment,
and in order to incentivize investment, entry costs should be “sufficiently” large. The intuition
is similar to the models of patent protection, where a concentrated market is more suitable
for undertaking investment. However, the mechanism is very different from this literature. In
our model investment works as a instrument to increase competition and this increases the
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rents that can be appropriated by the investing party. Hence, a competition authority should
only be concerned on establishing the conditions to ensure effective competition in the market
place and not on increasing the number of competitors.
Furthermore, the present paper provides a theory explaining the industry configuration
of the supply side of the market. In situations when the equilibrium outcome is competitive,
the buyer distributes his investment homogeneously among suppliers, creating an ex-post
homogenous market structure. Conversely, when the equilibrium outcome is less competitive,
the investment of the buyer is asymmetric and it is concentrated to a small group of suppliers.
This explains the coexistence of first with second tier suppliers. With regards to the number
of active suppliers, we also find that it depends on the level of competition. Because a higher
level of competition entails larger investment, a bigger number of suppliers have incentives
to become active. Hence, we find a reverse effect on entry and competition. In general the
equilibrium is characterized by too little entry. Our model then illustrate two different sources
of inefficiency and restoring full efficiency seems a daunting task.
Finally, the theory provided in this paper can be empirically tasted. The first thing is to
see whether cooperative investment is more likely to appear in more competitive industries and
the second is to observe whether cooperative investment is larger in industries characterized
by large set-up or entry costs.
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Appendix
A Appendix
Lemma 6. The loss of the trading surplus of any supplier i is bigger with larger investments of the
buyer. Then, for k′ and k such that we have k′i ≥ ki, ∀i ∈ N .
Li
(
k′ | J¯i
)
= TS∗(k′)− TS∗−i(k′−i) > TS∗(k)− TS∗−i(k−i) = Li
(
k | J¯i
)
.
Proof. The previous claim is equivalent to
TS∗(k′)− TS∗(k) > TS∗−i(k′−i)− TS∗−i(k−i).
We show that for any number of active suppliers N , the potential gains from trade are bigger when
the buyer invests more TS∗(k′) > TS∗(k)
TS∗(k) = U (X∗(K))−
∑
i
C(x∗i (k) | ki)
= U (X∗(k)) + U (X∗(k′))− U (X∗(k′))−
∑
i
C(x∗i (k) | ki)
≤ U (X∗(k))− U (X∗(k′)) + TS∗(k′)
=⇒TS∗(k′)− TS∗(k) ≥ U (X∗(k′))− U (X∗(k)) =
∫ X∗(k′)
X∗(k)
Ux(τ)dτ > 0,
and the last inequality comes from the optimal allocation represented in (4.1) that dictates X∗(k′) >
X∗(k).
From the previous, we know that TS∗(k′)−TS∗(k) > U (X∗(k′))−U (X∗(k)) = D. Furthermore,
we can show that:
TS∗−i(k
′
−i | J¯i) = U
(
X˜−i(k′ | J¯i)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
C(x˜j(k
′
−i | J¯i) | k′j)
< U
(
X˜−i(k′ | J¯i)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
C(x˜j(k
′
−i | J¯i) | kj)
= U
(
X˜−i(k′ | J¯i)
)
+ U
(
X˜−i, (k | J¯i)
)
− U
(
X˜−i(k | J¯i)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
C(x˜j(k
′
−i, | J¯i) | kj)
< U
(
X˜−i(k′ | J¯i)
)
− U
(
X˜−i(k | J¯i)
)
+ TS∗−i(k−i | J¯i)
=⇒TS∗−i(k′ | J¯i)− TS∗−i(k | J¯i) < U
(
X˜−i(k′ | J¯i)
)
− U
(
X˜−i(k | J¯i)
)
= D,
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and it is easy to see that
D > D →U (X∗(k′))− (X∗(k)) > U
(
X˜−i(k′ | J¯i)
)
− U
(
X˜−i(k | J¯i)
)
=
∫ X∗(k′)+X˜−i(k′|J¯i)
X∗(k)+X˜−i(k|J¯i)
Ux(τ)dτ > 0.
And this is the case as the increase in the total mount traded from an extra supplier is higher when
the buyer increases his total amount of investment X∗(k′)− X˜−i(k′ | J¯i) > X∗(k)− X˜−i(k | J¯i).
B Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: differentiating the first-order conditions for x∗j given in (4.1) with respect to
ki we obtain:
U ′′xx(X
∗)×
N∑
h=1
dx∗h
dki
= C ′′xx(x
∗
j | kj)×
dx∗j
dki
. (B.1)
Since the left hand side is independent of j we find that all dx∗j/dki have the same sign. Now
suppose also dx∗i /dki has that same sign. Then also the sum has that same sign and since U
′′
xx(·) < 0,
and C ′′xx(·) > 0 this leads to a contradiction because the right and the left hand side have different
signs. Now suppose dx∗i /dki < 0. The other signs therefore have to be positive. By (B.1) we find∑N
h=1 (dx
∗
h/dki) < 0, but the first-order condition for x
∗
i differentiated with respect to ki is
U ′′xx(X
∗)×
N∑
h=1
dx∗h
dki
= C ′′xx(x
∗
i | ki)×
dx∗i
dki
+ C ′′xk(x
∗
i | ki),
which would then have a positive left hand side and a negative right hand side due to C ′′xk(·) < 0 and
this leads again to a contradiction. We thus have shown point (i) and (ii). Again by (B.1) point (iii)
follows from ∂X∗/∂ki =
∑N
h=1 (dx
∗
h/dki).
Proof of lemma 2: The results comes directly from the concavity of the utility function and the
convexity of the cost function. Without loss of generality, we assume that the equilibrium allocation
is symmetric.17 The amount traded in equilibrium needs to satisfy
U ′x (N + 1× x∗(k, N + 1)) = C ′x (x∗(k, N + 1) | k) .
We proof the claim by contradiction, assume that x∗(k, N + 1) ≥ x∗(k, N), then we have that
N + 1× x∗(k, N + 1) > N × x∗(k, N). By the concavity of U ′x(·) and optimality it has to be the case
17Our results do not change for an asymmetric equilibrium allocation where we have to substitute N + 1×
x∗(k, N + 1) by
∑N+1
i=1 x
∗
i (k, N + 1).
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that
C ′x (x
∗(k, N + 1) | k) = U ′x (N + 1× x∗(k, N + 1)) < U ′x (N × x∗(k, N)) = C ′x (x∗(k, N) | k) ,
but by the convexity of C ′x(·) this implies that x∗(k, N+1) < x∗(k, N), which leads to a contradiction.
From the previous, we see that that X∗(k, N + 1) > X∗(k, N) comes directly.
Proof of lemma 3: We have to show that
X∗(k, N) > X∗−{Jki ,i}(k, N) +
∑
j∈Jki
x˜Jj (k | Jki ).
For any investment profile k and a set Jki , we know that
∑
h 6={Jki ,i} x
∗
h = X
∗
−{Jki ,i}
. Hence, the
expression above is equivalent to
∑
j∈Jki x
∗
j + x
∗
i >
∑
j∈Jki x˜j(k | J
k
i ). Therefore since x
∗
i > 0 if∑
j∈Jki
(
x∗j − x˜j(k | Jki )
)
> 0 we are done. Observe that for a given investment profile, if the above is
true it also has to be true for any j ∈ Jki , hence x∗j > x˜j(k | Jki ). If the contrary occurs, x∗j < x˜j(k | Jki ),
then from the equilibrium allocation we have
U ′x
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈J′i
x˜j(k | Jki )
 = C ′x(x˜j(k | Jki )) > C ′x(x∗j ) = U ′x(X∗),
and by the concavity of U we prove the claim. The previous also implies that for any j ∈ Jki we have
x˜j(k | Jki ) > x∗j . Using the same procedure we can easily prove that for any J ′,ki ⊆ Jki we have
X∗−{Jki ,i} +
∑
j∈Jki
x˜j(k, | Jki ) ≥ X∗−{J′ki ,i} +
∑
j∈J′ki
x˜j(k
′ | J ′ki ),
and we also obtain that x˜j(k
′ | J ′ki ) ≥ x˜j(k | Jki ).
Proof of proposition 2: Here, we consider the equilibrium where the suppliers submit the efficient
allocation. The equilibrium transfer for supplier i depend on the set Jki and for a given investment
profile k this is equal to
Ti(J
k
i ) = U (X
∗)−
 max
{xj}j∈Jk
i
U
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈Jki
xj | x˜i = 0,k
− ∑
j∈Jki
C(xj | kj)
+ ∑
j∈Jki
C(x∗j | kj)
 .
33
Operating we obtain:
Ti(J
k
i ) = U (X
∗)−
 max
{xj}j∈Jk
i
U
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈J1
xj | x˜i = 0,k
− ∑
j∈Jki
C(xj)
+ ∑
j∈Jki
C(x∗j | kj)

= U(X∗)−
∑
j∈Jki
C(x∗j | kj)−
U
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈Jki
x˜j(k, J
k
i ) | x˜i = 0,k
− ∑
j∈Jki
C(x˜j(k, J
k
i ))

= U(X∗)−
∑
j∈Jki
C(x∗j | kj)−
U
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈Jki
x˜j(k, J
k
i ) | x˜i = 0,k
− ∑
j∈Jki
C(x˜j(k, J
k
i ))

+
 ∑
j 6∈Jki ,i
(
C(x∗j | kj)− C(x∗j | kj)
)+ [C(x∗i | ki)− C(x∗i | ki)]
= TS∗(k)−
U
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈Jki
x˜j(k, J
k
i ) | x˜i = 0,k
− ∑
j∈Jki
C(x˜j(k, J
k
i ) | kj)−
∑
j 6=Jki ,i
C(x∗j | kj)

+ C(x∗i | ki)
= TS∗(k)− T˜ S−i(k | Jki ) + C(x∗i | ki).
By putting this to the payoff functions in (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain the result.
Proof of proposition 1: We start the proof by calculating the change on the trading surplus by
an increase of investment. Later we show that the trading surplus is maximized by setting the same
level of investment to all active suppliers.
By taking the first order condition of the trading surplus with respect to investment
∂TS(k)
∂ki
= U ′x
(∑
N
x∗i (k)
)
×
N∑
j=1
∂x∗j (k)
∂ki
− C ′x (x∗i (k) | ki)×
N∑
j=1
∂x∗j (k)
∂ki
− C ′k (x∗i (k) | ki)
− φ′K(K)×
∂K
∂ki
= 0
=⇒
[
U ′x
(∑
N
x∗i (k)
)
− C ′x (x∗i (k) | ki)
]
×
N∑
j=1
∂x∗j (k)
∂ki
− C ′k (x∗i (k) | ki)− φ′K(K) = 0
=⇒ φ′K(K∗) = −C ′k (x∗i (k∗) | ki) , ∀i ∈ N,
and the last line comes from the application of the envelope theorem.
We proceed to show that the distribution of investment that maximizes the trading surplus is
symmetric. At this purpose, we compare the benefits of an increase of investment by the buyer in a
situation where this increase is distributed symmetrically, to an extreme case where it is allocated to
only one of the suppliers. Later, we see that this result can be easily extended to any asymmetric
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distribution.
Consider a symmetric distribution of an aggregate investment K, and each suppliers trades an
amount x∗i (k, N). The buyer then distributes an arbitrarily small increase of investment ∆K. A
symmetric distribution gives a new new vector of investment ks where ks = k+ ∆KN . An a asymmetric
distribution implies that for a given supplier j ∈ N , kaj = k+∆K and for all i 6= j the investment stays
the same kai = k. The extra gains of both strategies are ∆
s = TS∗(ks)−TS∗(k) and ∆a = TS∗(ka)−
TS∗(k), which is approximately equal to ∆s ≈ −∑Ni=1 C ′k (x∗i (ks) | ksi ) and ∆a ≈ −C ′k (x∗j (ka) | kaj ).18
Hence, by comparing both gains we obtain
∆s −∆a > 0 =⇒ −
N∑
i=1
C ′k (x
∗
i (k
s) | ksi ) > −C ′k
(
x∗j (k
a) | kaj
)
=⇒− (N − 1)C ′k (x∗i (ks) | ksi ) > −C ′k
(
x∗j (k
a) | kaj
)
+ C ′k
(
x∗j (k
s) | ksj
)
= −
∫ x∗j (ka)
x∗j (ks)
C ′′′xkk(τ)dτ,
where the last equality comes from the application of the fundamental theorem of calculus.
The previous condition is always fulfilled because the left hand side is positive and the right hand
side is negative. This is the case due to assumption C ′′′xkk(·) > 0, and by lemma 1 where we showed
that for any k′i > ki then x
∗
j (k
′, N) > x∗j (k).
We can easy extend this reasoning with any other asymmetric distribution. Consider, the buyer
distributes the increase of investment to any subset Jk of suppliers. Then for any j ∈ Jk we have
kJj = K +
∆K
|Jk| where the denominator is the cardinality of the set. Therefore for any J
k ⊂ N we
obtain
−(N − ∣∣Jk∣∣)× C ′k (x∗i (ks) | ksi ) > −∑
j∈Jk
∫ x∗j (kJ )
x∗j (ks)
C ′′′xkk(τ)dτ,
and this is always the case by the same argumentation as before.
The argument here is local, but it can be easily extended globally. To illustrate this case, consider
a situation where the buyer allocates her investment to only one supplier. Then, by following the same
argument as before, there exist local deviations where the buyer redistributes the investment to other
active suppliers. Indeed, there will always be local deviations until the investment is symmetrically
distributed.
Proof of lemma 4: We start from considering the case where the equilibrium outcome is the most
competitive i.e. Jki = N \{i} = J¯ki and we show that the buyer will set the same level of investment to
18Observe that those gains are approximated because we only take into consideration direct gains. It is true
that with an asymmetric distribution of investment there are always reduction of production costs for the non
investing suppliers via the reduction of the equilibrium allocation. However this effect is of second order and
we neglect it here.
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all suppliers. We proceed by construction. First, we show that an increase of the level of investment of
supplier j 6= i decreases the payoff of any supplier i. Second, we see that those payoffs are minimized
if the buyer sets the same level of investment to all suppliers.
The equilibrium payoff for every supplier i in the most competitive equilibrium is equals to pii(k |
J¯ki ) = TS
∗(k)−TS∗−i(k−i | J¯ki ). And the second part is the maximization of the trading surplus with
all the rest of the suppliers. The payoff of any supplier i decreases with the investment undertaken to
any other supplier by the amount
∂pii(k | J¯ki )
∂kj
=
[
∂TS∗(k)
∂kj
− ∂TS
∗
−i(k−i | J¯ki )
∂kj
]
= −C ′k(x∗j (k) | kj) + C ′k(x˜j(k−i | J¯ki ) | kj)
=
∫ x˜j(k−i|J¯ki )
x∗j (k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ < 0.
The first equality is obtained by applying the envelope theorem, and the last strict inequality
comes from assumption 2 and lemma 3. Setting an equal level of investment comes directly from
an observation of the second part of the payoffs. Because TS∗−i(k−i | J¯ki ) does not depend on the
investment undertaken to supplier i, minimizing his payoffs is equivalent to set the vector of investments
k−i such that expression TS∗−i(k−i | J¯ki ) is maximized. By the same argument as in proposition 1 we
obtain that kj = k for all j ∈ N .
We use the same procedure to show the distribution of investment by any other level of competition
i.e Jk < N \ {i}. By calculating the first order condition and applying the envelope theorem, we get
how the payoffs of any supplier i changes with the investment done to any other supplier j
∂
([
TS∗(k)− T˜ S−i(k | Jki )
])
∂kj
= −C ′k(x∗j ) + C ′k(x˜Jj (Jki ))
−
 ∑
m 6=Jki ,i
U ′x
X∗−{Jki ,i} + ∑
j∈Jki
x˜j
− C ′x(x∗m)
× dx∗m
dkj

=
∫ x˜j(kJki )
x∗j (k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ −
∑
m6=Jki ,i
(∫ X∗−{Jk
i
,i}+
∑
j∈J x˜j
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
dx∗m
dkj
.
The first part is similar to the one with the most competitive outcome and the part comes from
the fact that when constraining the transfers of all suppliers, the allocation of the suppliers that
do not coordinate their equilibrium offers remains unchanged. As before, the first part is negative
by assumption C ′′xk(·) < 0 and lemma 3. The second is positive by assumption U ′′xx(·) < 0 and by
lemmas 1 and 3. Moreover, the magnitude of this second part depends on the degree of the “allocative
sensitivity” dx∗m/dkj . From the same argument as before, the buyer sets the same level of investment
to the suppliers in Jki .
The second part of the constructive argument comes directly from the fact that an increase of the
investment to any supplier i = l constraints the equilibrium transfer of the set of suppliers in Jki . Since
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the group of suppliers j ∈ Jki constraint all active suppliers, their level of investment is larger than for
the supplier that only puts a constraint on the set of suppliers Jki . Finally, it is optimal for the buyer
to set a level of zero investment to all the other suppliers km = 0 for m 6= J, l, because those suppliers
do not constraint the payment of any other supplier.
Proof of proposition 3: That investment is symmetric when the equilibrium outcome is the most
competitive is proven in lemma 4. Each supplier then trades the same amount with the buyer and the
former does not depend on the identity of supplier i. Hence, the individual amount of investment is
obtained by the first order condition.
∂Π(k | J¯k)
∂k
= −C ′k (x∗(k) | k)− [−C ′k (x∗(k) | k)]−
∑
N−1
[−C ′k (x∗(k) | k) + C ′k (x˜(k−1 | J¯k) | k)]
− φ′K(K)×
∂K
∂k
= 0
=⇒ φ′K(K) = −
∑
N−1
[∫ x˜(k−1|J¯k)
x∗(k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
]
≡ ζ.
In the first line of the equation we see that the direct benefit from investment is fully appropriated
by the supplier. This result comes directly from the fact that investment in this case is cooperative
and the party that does not invest appropriates all the rents.19 However, an increase on the amount
invested to a given supplier creates a negative indirect externality to all other suppliers as their “loss”
of exclusion is reduced. To establish that for a given number of suppliers N , the buyer under-invest
in equilibrium, we compare the right hand side of the efficient investment profile with the one that we
have just obtained. We get that the former is always larger than the latter by assumption C ′′xk(·) < 0
and lemma 3.
− C ′k (x∗(k) | k) > ζ → −C ′k (x∗(k) | k) > −
∑
N−1
[∫ x˜(k−i|J¯ki )
x∗(k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
]
→
∑
N−1
[
C ′k
(
x˜(k−i | J¯ki ) | k
)− C ′k (x∗(k) | k)]− C ′k (x∗(k) | k) > 0→ ∫ X˜∗−i(k−i)
X∗(k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ > 0.
To show point ii) we calculate the first order condition of the buyer’s payoff with respect to
individual level of investment kj whenever j ∈ Jki . The payoff of the common buyer and this is
Π(k | Jk) = TS∗(k)−∑i [TS∗(k)− T˜ S−i(k | Jki )]. What differs from the most competitive equilibria
is the term T˜ S
J
−i(k | Jki ), which depends on the vector of all investments. Because only a set of
suppliers coordinate their out of equilibrium offers, there is only re-optimization of the amount traded
by only those set of suppliers. Hence, the unchanged equilibrium quantities, X∗−{Jki ,i}
(k), depend on
19This is also the case because we have considered a bidding game where the suppliers submit the contracts
to the buyer which gives all the bargaining power to the suppliers.
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the overall investment profile k, and when deriving the equilibrium investment profile, there will be an
extra effect coming from this unchanged efficient equilibrium, which stays absent in the most aggressive
equilibrium due to the envelope condition.
Therefore, by calculating the first order condition with respect to kj , and by applying the envelope
theorem we obtain
∂Π(k | Jk)
∂kj
= −C ′k
(
x∗j (k) | kj
)
+ C ′k
(
x∗j (k) | kj
)− ∑
i∈N\{j}
[−C ′k (x∗i (k) | ki) + C ′k (x˜i(k | Jk) | ki)]
+
∑
i∈N
∑
m 6=Jk,l
U ′x
X∗−{Jk,l} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j(k | Jk) + x˜l(k | Jk)
− C ′x(x∗j | kj)
× dx∗m
dkj
− φ′K(K)×
∂K
∂kj
= 0
=⇒ φ′K(K) = −
∑
i∈N\{j}
[∫ x˜i(k|Jk)
x∗i (k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
]
+
∑
i
∑
m 6=Jk,l
[∫ X∗−{Jk,l}+∑j∈Jk x˜j(k|Jk)+x˜l(k|Jk)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
× dx
∗
m
dkj
≡ ℵ(Jk) ∀j ∈ Jk.
Again, the first line of of the equation is the direct benefit from investment, and it is fully appropriated
by the supplier. The other extra parts are the once referring to an increase of the competitive pressure.
To determine whether the investment is positive, we need to study the sign of ℵJ(Jk). The first sum
is positive and the second negative for the same argument as provided in lemma 4. Later, we provide
a formal analysis establishing the conditions where the investment is positive, and this would depend
on the degree of the “allocative sensitivity” i.e. dx∗m/dkj . If this is too big, then the second part of
ℵ(Jk) dominates and the buyers sets a zero level of investment. We proceed by calculating the first
order condition with respect to the supplier that restricts the payoff of the most efficient suppliers Jk
who, in lemma 4, we have denoted by l. Hence, by applying the same reasoning as before, we obtain
φ′K(K) = −
∫ x˜l(k)
x∗l (k)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ+
∑
i
∑
m 6=Jk,l
[∫ X∗−{J\{i},l}+∑j∈J\{i} x˜j(k|Jk)+x˜l(k|Jk)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
×dx
∗
m
dkj
≡ η(Jk),
(B.2)
where the quantities in the previous expressions are given by
{x˜j}j∈Jk = arg max
U
X∗−{Jk,l} + x˜l(k | Jk) + ∑
j∈Jki
xj(k | Jk)
− ∑
j∈Jk
C(xj | kj)
 ,
x˜l = arg max
U
X∗−{Jki ,l} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j(k | Jk) + xl(k | Jk)
− C(xl | kl)
 .
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We proceed to study under which conditions the buyer decides to set a positive level of investment,
i.e. ℵ(Jk) > 0.
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m 6=Jk,l
dx∗m
dkj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
−∑i∈N\{j} [∫ x˜i(k|Jk)x∗i (k) C ′′xk(τ)dτ]∑
i∈N
[∫X∗−{Jk,l}+∑j∈J x˜j(k|Jk)+x˜l(k|Jk)
X∗ U
′′
xx(τ)dτ
] = λ(Jk).
In order to prove that the previous exist we introduce the following result, whose derivation comes
directly from Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009). The function V
(
X∗−{Jk,l}
)
is well defined due to Inada
conditions. By the envelop theorem we have V ′
(
X∗−{Jk,l}
)
> 0 and V ′′
(
X∗−{Jk,l}
)
< 0, which implies
that the function is strictly increasing and strictly concave. By the implicit function theorem, we find
that
∂x˜Jj
(
X∗−{Jk,l}
)
∂X∗−{Jk,l}
=
U ′′(·)
C ′′(·)− U ′′(·) < 0.
And the reduction is of lower magnitude because
∂x˜Jj
(
X∗−{Jk,l}
)
∂X∗−{Jk,l}
=
U ′′(·)
C ′′(·)− U ′′(·) < −1→ 0 < −C
′′(·).
We proceed to show existence.
ℵ(Jk) = −
∑
i∈N\{j}
[C ′k(x˜i | ki)− C ′k(x∗i | ki)]+
∑
i∈N
∑
m6=Jk,l
U ′x
X∗−{Jk,l} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l)− U ′x(X∗)
×dx∗m
dkj
.
(B.3)
A Taylor approximation for the utility and production costs are:
C ′k(x˜i | ki) ≈ C ′k(x∗i | ki) +
n∑
t=1
1
t!
∂t
∂xt∂k
C
(
x˜i | ki
)× (x˜i − x∗i )k ,
U ′x
X∗−{Jk,i} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l
 ≈ U ′x(X∗)+ n∑
t=1
1
t!
∂t
∂xt
U
(
X∗−{Jk,i}+
∑
j∈Jk
x˜j+x˜l
)×
X∗−{Jk,i} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l
−X∗
k ,
and by taking the first order approximation, we have:
C ′k(x˜i | ki)− C ′k(x∗i | ki) ≈ C ′′xk
(
x˜i | ki
)× (x˜i − x∗i ) ,
U ′x
X∗−{Jk,i} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l
−U ′x(X∗) ≈ U ′′xx(X∗−{Jk,i}+∑
j∈Jk
x˜j+x˜l
)×
(X∗−{Jk,i} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l)−X∗
 .
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If we introduce this to expression (B.3) we obtain:
ℵ(Jk) ≈−
∑
i∈N\{j}
[
C ′xk
(
x˜i | ki
)× (x˜i − x∗i )]
+
∑
i∈N
∑
m 6=Jk,i
U ′′xx(X∗−{Jk,i} + ∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l
)×
∑
j∈Jk
x˜j −
∑
j∈Jk
x∗j − x∗i
× dx∗m
dkj
.
(B.4)
We also know that the efficient allocation for the group of suppliers in Jk most efficient supplier
dictates that U ′x
(
X∗−{Jk,i} +
∑
j∈Jk x˜j + x˜l
)
= C ′x(x˜j | kj), and by differentiating by kj we get:
U ′′xx(X
∗
−{Jk,i} +
∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l)×
 ∑
m 6=Jk,i
∂x∗m
∂kj
+
∂x˜j
∂kj
 = C ′′xk(x˜i) + C ′′xx(x˜i)× ∂x˜i∂kj
→ U ′′xx(X∗−{Jk,i} +
∑
j∈Jk
x˜j + x˜l) =
C ′′xk(x˜i) + C
′′
xx(x˜i)× ∂x˜i∂kj[∑
m 6=Jk,i
∂x∗m
∂kj
+
∂xˆj
∂kj
] . (B.5)
Finally, by introducing this to expression (B.3) we obtain
ℵ(Jk) ≈ −
∑
i∈N\{j}
[
C ′′xk
(
x˜i | ki
)× (x˜i − x∗i )]
+
∑
i
(C ′′xk(x˜i) + C ′′xx(x˜i)× ∂x˜i∂kj
)
×
∑
j∈Jk
x˜j −
∑
j∈Jk
x∗j − x∗i
×
 ∑m 6=Jk,i ∂x∗m∂kj∑
m6=Jk,i
∂x∗m
∂kj
+
∂xˆj
∂kj
 ,
(B.6)
and we see that the first part is positive and the second is negative. However, the magnitude of
the second part depends crucially on the term
(∑
m 6=Jk,i
∂x∗m
∂kj
/
∑
m 6=Jk,i
∂x∗m
∂kj
+
∂xˆj
∂kj
)
and this term
has little effect, if the term
∣∣∣∑m6=Jk,i ∂x∗m∂kj ∣∣∣ is not too large. Moreover, it is also the case that the
maximizer x˜j is negatively affected by a change of X
∗
−{Jk,i}, and we have previously seen that this
effect is of lower magnitude. In words, if the investment that the buyer undertakes to supplier j ∈ Jk
does not have much effect on the efficient allocation for the non investing suppliers, the buyer decides
to set a positive level of investment and the reasoning is the one that we have exposed in the main
text. By using a similar procedure we obtain the conditions for the investment of the second most
efficient supplier to be positive.
Proof of lemma 5: We show that the higher the number of suppliers, the lower is the individual
investment undertaken with any supplier. We start with the case when competition is the most
aggressive and we then proceed to analyze the case when suppliers tacitly collude to reduce the level of
competition, and without loss of generality, we will pay attention to the situation where competition
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is the least severe.
Define DHC(N) = ζ(∆N) − ζ(N) the difference in the left hand side whenever competition is
severe
D(N) = ζ(∆N)− ζ(N) = −
∫ N×x˜j(N |J¯k)
N×x∗j (∆N)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ +
∫ (N−1)×x˜j(N−1|J¯k)
(N−1)×x∗j (N)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
=
∫ N×x∗j (∆N)+(N−1)×x˜(N−1|J¯k)
N×x˜j(N |J¯k)+(N−1)×x∗j (N)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ < 0,
and it is negative due to assumption C ′′xk(·) < 0 and by the concavity of the problem we know that the
upper part of the integral is bigger than the lower part that is (N − 1)× (x˜j(N − 1 | J¯k)− x∗j (N)) >
N × (x˜j(N | J¯k)− x∗j (∆N)) .
We proceed to show that the higher the number of supplier the lower is the investment undertaken
to each supplier j ∈ Jk. Without loss of generality, we consider the case of the least competitive
equilibrium and we make use of the following difference DLC(N) = ℵ1(∆N)− ℵ1(N) < 0.
ℵ(∆N | J)− ℵ(N | J) =
∫ (N−1)×x˜j(N−1|J)
(N−1)×x∗j (N)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ −
∫ N×x˜j(N |J)
N×x∗j (k+i,∆N)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ
+
∑
i6=J
∑
m6=J,i
[∫ X∗−{J,i}+x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
× dx
∗
m(N)
dkj
−
∑
i+1 6=J
∑
m6=J,i
[∫ X∗−{J,i}+x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
× dx
∗
m(∆N)
dkj
=
∫ N×x∗j (k+i,∆N)+(N−1)×x˜j(N−1|J)
N×x˜j(N |J)+(N−1)×x∗j (k,N)
C ′′xk(τ)dτ + κ(N) < 0,
where
κ(N) ≡
∑
i 6=J
∑
m 6=i,J
[∫ X∗−{J,i}+x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
×dx
∗
m(N)
dkj
−
∑
i+16=J
∑
m 6=J,i
[∫ X∗−{J,i}+x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
]
×dx
∗
m(∆N)
dkj
,
and it is negative due to assumption C ′′xk(·) < 0 and by the concavity of the problem we know
that the upper part of the integral is bigger than the lower part which is equivalent to (N − 1) ×(
x˜j(N − 1 | J)− x∗j (N)
)
> N × (x˜j(N | J)− x∗j (k+i,∆N)). It is also the case that κ(N) < 0 as it is
easy to show that |dx∗(N)/dkj | > |dx∗(∆N)/dkj | and this is of first order effect.
Proof of proposition 4: For the case of efficiency, it is easy to see that as the objective is to
maximize welfare, the higher the total amount transacted the higher will be the aggregate level of
investment. Then, we see that the aggregate level of investment will be increasing with the number
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of active suppliers. Nevertheless, as the cost of investment is convex the level of aggregate investment
is concave with the number of active suppliers. Regarding the equilibrium aggregate investment, the
result when replacement is undertaken by only one supplier is immediate. From lemma 4, we know
that the buyer only sets a positive level of investment to two active suppliers and from lemma 5 we
know that the per-supplier level of investment decreases with the amount of active suppliers. Hence,
the aggregate level of investment decreases with the number of active suppliers.
For the most competitive equilibrium the analysis is less direct and we see that the aggregate level
of investment will be decreasing if the following holds
N × ζ(∆N) < (N − 1)× ζ(N)→ ζ(∆N)− ζ(N) < −ζ(N)
N
,
and both the left hand side and the right hand side are negative. The above condition is equivalent
to ζ(N)N < ζ(N)− ζ(∆N) and we know that this is always true by applying the Jensen’s inequality to
the concave function ζ.
In the limit, we have that the competition arising between suppliers is large and the effect that
investment have on increasing further the level of ex-post competition is small. As a result, cooper-
ative investment decreases and it tends to zero with an arbitrary large number of active suppliers.
Technically, the term dictating the level of individual investment converges to 0, i.e. limN→+∞ ζ(N) =
limN→+∞ ℵ(N, Jk) = limN→+∞ η(N, Jk) = 0 for all Jk ⊂ N .
Proof of proposition 5: For a given number of active suppliers N and a set of suppliers J . The
expected payoff for each supplier is
E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)] = TS∗(k)− 1
N
[∣∣Jk∣∣× T˜ S−j(k | Jk) + T˜ S−l(k | Jk) + (N − 1− ∣∣Jk∣∣)× T˜ S−m(k | Jk)] .
We start by considering how the expected payoff changes with an increase on the number of active
suppliers and this is approximately equal to:
=
−N2 × TS∗(k) + ∣∣Jk∣∣× T˜ S−j(k) + T˜ S−l(k) + (∣∣Jk∣∣+ 1)× T˜ SJ−m(kJ)
N2
+
∂TS∗(k)
∂N
−
∣∣Jk∣∣
N
× ∂T˜S−j(k)
∂N
− 1
N
× ∂T˜S−l(k)
∂N
− N −
(∣∣Jk∣∣+ 1)
N
× ∂T˜S−m(k)
∂N
+
(
∂TS∗(k)
∂k
−
∣∣Jk∣∣
N
× ∂T˜S−j(k)
∂k
− 1
N
× ∂T˜S
J
−l(k
J)
∂kJ
− N −
(∣∣Jk∣∣+ 1)
N
× ∂T˜S−m(k)
∂k
)
× ∇k
∂N
,
where the first line represents the direct effect, and the next two are the indirect effects. It is easy to
see that the whole effect is negative i.e. ∂
(
E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)]) /∂N < 0. The direct effect is negative,
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since TS∗(k) > T˜S−h(k | Jk) for any h ∈ N , and this tells us that the likelihood of being the supplier
to which the buyer decides to invest is smaller. The second line, in the previous equation is also
negative as the effect that an extra supplier has in the gains from trade deceases with N due to its
concavity. Finally, we also obtain a negative impact from the last line. By lemma 6, in the first part
of the appendix, we know that ∂TS∗(kJ)/∂k > ∂T˜S−h(k | Jk)/∂k for any h ∈ N but this effects is
negative by the fact that ∇kJ/∂N < 0 by lemma 5.
By fixing the number of active suppliers, we consider how the expected payoff changes with an
increase in the number of suppliers belonging to Jk. This effect is approximately given by:
∂
(
E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)])
∂Jk
=
− 1
N
(
T˜ S−j(k)− T˜ S−m(k)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+− 1
N
×
(∣∣Jk∣∣× ∂T˜S−j(k)
∂Jk
+
∂T˜S−l(k)
∂Jk
+ (N − 1− ∣∣Jk∣∣)× ∂T˜S−m(k)
∂Jk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
[
∂TS∗(k)
∂k
− 1
N
×
(∣∣Jk∣∣× ∂T˜S−j(k)
∂k
+
∂T˜S−l(k)
∂k
+ (N − 1− ∣∣Jk∣∣)× ∂T˜S−m(k)
∂k
)]
× ∇k
∂Jk︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
,
where the first and the second line represents the direct effect and the third line is for the indirect effect.
While the first line of the direct effect is positive due to T˜ S−j(k | Jk) < T˜S−m(kJ | Jk), we have that
the second line is negative due to a lower partition of the trading surplus due to larger competition.
The indirect effect is also negative as ∂TS∗(k)/∂k > ∂T˜S−h(k)/∂k for any h ∈ N due to lemma 6 and
∇k/∂Jk > 0. The whole effect is in general positive and we have that ∂ (E [pii (k | N, Jk)]) /∂Jk > 0,
and the payoffs per supplier increase whenever competition is more aggressive.
Proof of corollary 2: This is straightforward to proof. We make explicit use of lemma 5. When-
ever the “allocative sensitivity” is to large such that the equilibrium investment is zero, i.e. kJ = 0
then we know that T˜ S−j(kJ | Jk) = T˜ S−m(kJ | Jk) and ∇kJ/∂Jk > 0. Then we obtain
∂
(
E
[
pii
(
k | N, Jk)])
∂Jk
= − 1
N
×
(∣∣Jk∣∣× ∂T˜S−j(k)
∂Jk
+
∂T˜S−l(k)
∂Jk
+ (N − 1− ∣∣Jk∣∣)× ∂T˜S−m(k)
∂Jk
)
< 0.
Whenever the “allocative sensitivity” is not to large such that the equilibrium investment is positive
then the result follows directly from lemma 5.
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